Polygamy versus Democracy

The June 5, 2006 issue of the Weekly Standard has an article written by Stanley Kurtz titled “Polygamy Versus Democracy: you can’t have both.” (Kurtz is an adjunct fellow of the Hudson Institute, Senior Fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, and has written for National Review Online, Weekly Standard, Policy Review, The Wall Street Journal, and Commentary.) His general thesis is polygamy, or more broadly polyamorous unions, as well as gay marriage are antithetical to democratic values. He writes, “American democracy rests upon specific family structures.” In his article he outlines what he believes is a relationship between polygamy and tyranny, and a large section of his article is dedicated to an analysis of 19th century Mormon polygamy—The Mormon church officially discontinued the practice of polygamy in 1890. Under the section titled “The Mormon Question” he draws parallels between the United States Government’s struggle to stamp out Mormon polygamy and the current war on terror. “In effect, the fight against polygamy was a slow, frustrating, expensive, ultimately successful campaign to democratize Utah. (The parallels to the war on terror are eerie)” (parenthesis original). Writing that “the Mormons renounced polygamy and set themselves on the path to democracy.”

Being a devout Mormon that naturally ticked me off. But for this post I shall focus on only one sentence from his article.

“Religious leaders schooled their families privately, while most of the territory’s children remained illiterate.”

The data
Because I am a mega-nerd, and because I was so irritated by Kurtz’s article, I spent the last year collecting education data for every US state and territory for every year from 1870 to 1899 from the annual reports of the United States Commissioner of Education (COE reports), as well as illiteracy rates for every state and territory in the US from the 1860, 1870, 1880, 1890, and 1900 census. Education statistics from the 19th century can be tricky. And I nearly have my database in a usable format. Some of the results are rather embarrassing for Utah, but most are ordinary or nearly so. But I’ll save that for later posts. One metric that is fairly objective is the illiteracy rates, reported in the census. The census divides the data into age groups, race, sex, and parentage. You can find the census data for the years I cover (here) at the US Census Bureau. The earlier census’ have less detail; the 1900 census has the most.

I shall compare the illiterate white population of the states of the United States with the illiterate white population of Utah.

You will find Kurtz’s assertion that “most of the territory’s children remained illiterate” is patently false. But how did it originate?

The Mormon Question
In Kurtz’s polygamy vs democracy article he mentions a book written by Sara Barringer Gordon, The Mormon Question, which apparently was an important source of information.[1] In Gordon’s book she mentions many of the issues surrounding Utah common schools during the polygamy years. Here are two quotes.

“Indeed, the majority of Mormon children did not attend school until the 1890’s” (p. 198)

“Local schools, although they did exist in many communities by the 1880’s, generally were privately financed, and understaffed” (p. 199)

Based on my own research I do find fault with what the first quote asserts. The second quote is partially correct. According to my data, from 1870 to 1899 the enrollment rates for Utah common schools were never below 50%.

From the 1890-91 COE report the average enrollment in Utah common schools was 65%. Rather low, but considering the average for the US was 68% it’s not too bad. However, even with this low number Utah had higher enrollments than the common schools of Texas, Idaho, New Jersey, District of Columbia, Maryland, Wyoming, Rhode Island, Virginia, Georgia, North Carolina, Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, New Mexico, South Carolina, and Louisiana. I don’t have private school enrollment data for 1890 Utah.[2]

For 1889-90 school year I calculated common school enrollment as a percentage of the 1890 school age population because the school age populations were not listed in the ‘88-89 COE report (so the percentages will be different). The average common school enrollment for Utah was about 52% compared to a value of 68% for the US. However, when private and common school enrollments are considered the overall enrollment for Utah school children becomes 66%, which compares more favorably to the US value of 76% for common and private enrollment. Indeed the 1888-90 COE report indicates 20.94% of Utah’s school age population were enrolled in private schools—The next highest percentage was New Jersey at 16.81%. The private school enrollment for the Western Division was around 8%, Utah omitted.[3]

In 1880 common school enrollment for Utah was 51%, and 65% for the US. In 1870 Utah was at 50% and the US 56%.[4]

I’ll eventually do a post on how Utah compares to other states in enrollment and attendance, and other stats, but for now this will have to do.

Stanley Ivins
Gordon references a paper by sociologist Stanley Ivins, “Free Schools Come to Utah,” published in the Utah Historical Quarterly.[5] In it Ivins lists some school statistics. For example,

“By 1866 attendance had increased to 40%, and by 1876 to 44%. In the early eighties it began to drop, and by 1889, was down to 36%...for the years between 1862 and 1890, average attendance per school throughout the territory, was 44%.”

Note that Ivins lists only percent attendance, not enrollment. Ivins failed to list average US attendance, or any other like comparisons. I calculated from the COE reports and census data the average daily attendance for the United States as a percentage of the 5 to18 school age population: 29% in 1870; 39% in 1880; 44% in 1890; and 47% in 1899.[6] Ivins does not factor for private school attendance. From the 1860 Census, 58% of Utah’s white student age population attended school during the year; for the United States it was 60% of the white school age population. (The 1860 Census data seems to be if a student attended school he or she was counted.[7] So this is probably not average daily attendance.)

(*** TYPO: I rechecked my average daily attendance numbers for the US and they are 41% in 1870 and 42 % in 1880. The percentages for 1890 and 1899 are correct. I also neglected to mention that those numbers are for public schools only. ***)

Definition of “ordinary”
My contention is that Utah illiteracy rates for 1860, 70, 80, 90, and 1900 are “ordinary.” So what do I mean by ordinary? Any data point between Q1 and Q3. That is, between the 25th and 75th percentile, in the middle 50% of the data. This is tighter than a standard deviation, which covers about 68% of a normal distribution. If a data point is between Q1 and Q3, as far as I am concerned it qualifies as ordinary.

From Wikipedia, “Box Plot”

1860 Census
(click for larger image)
(Red dot indicates Utah)
(Better than ordinary)

In 1860 the median illiteracy rate for the United States was 5.6% for males and 9.2% for females. For Utah it was 1.2% for males and 2.7% for females.

Key
The boxplots are made from the illiteracy data for the states of the United States, Utah omitted. The red dots indicate illiteracy rates for Utah. The heavy dark line indicates the median US value. The line above and below the median are Q3 and Q1 respectively (75th and 25th percentile). Outliers are indicated by an open circle. This pattern applies to all the graphs below.

1870 Census
(click for larger image)
(Utah is well within ordinary.)

1880 Census
(click for larger image)
(Utah is very ordinary for each sex and for every age group.)

1890 Census
(click for larger image)
(Except for one data point everything is ordinary for Utah.)

The year 1890 is important because it is the year the announcement Mormons refer to as “the Manifesto” was given. The Manifesto was a public declaration that the Mormon Church has discontinued the practice of polygamy. It is included in our scriptures as Official Declaration-1.

Key
Green: Native white population of native parents.
Blue: Native white population of foreign parents.
Purple: Foreign white population.

Examples
Native White (NP) 10-14 M = Native white population of native parents, ages 10 to 14 Males.
Native White (FP) 10-14 F = Native white population of foreign parents, ages 10 to 14 Females.
Foreign White 10 to 14 M = Foreign born white population, ages 10 to 14 Males.

1900 Census
(click for larger image)
(As you can see, Utah is doing pretty well!)

Key
Green: Native white population of native parents.
Blue: Native white population of foreign parents.
Purple: Foreign white population.

Examples
Native White (NP) 10-14 M = Native white population of native parents, ages 10 to 14 Males.
Native White (FP) 10-14 F = Native white population of foreign parents, ages 10 to 14 Females.
Foreign White 10 to 14 M = Foreign born white population, ages 10 to 14 Males.

End Notes____________________________
[1] For book reviews of The Mormon Question from LDS perspectives see Terryl L. Givens (here) and Nathan B. Oman (here) in BYU Studies, and Kathleen Flake (here) in Dialogue.

[2] Percentage of the 5 to 18 school age population. School age population from 1890-91 COE report.

[3] Percentage of the 5 to 18 school age population. School age population from 1890-91 COE report. For 1889-90 I calculated common school enrollment as a percent of the 1890 school age population because the school age populations were not listed in the ‘88-89 COE report, so the percentages will be different.

[4] Percentage of the 5 to 18 school age population. School age population from 1880 and 1870 US Census.

[5] Ivins, S.S., Free Schools Come to Utah, Utah Historical Quarterly, vol. 22, No. 4, p. 321, 1954.

[6] 1870 and 1880 school age populations from US Census.

[7] From the 1860 Census, “The average number of pupils attending school during the year amounted to nearly one in six for the entire population, and to almost one in five for the free white inhabitants of the Union.”

Gay Marriage: The Iowa Supreme Court

Related Posts: Gay Marriage Again; Gay Marriage; More on gay marriage

I keep going on about the gay marriage debate. And I admit, it is not always directly connected to Mormonism. But I feel this debate will become rather more heated than it already is, and religion will be closely scrutinized because of its connection and effectiveness in opposing gay marriage. This will broaden the debate. The Iowa Supreme Court in overturning Iowa's Defense of Marriage Act has in its final decision set a precedent that I believe is disturbing. Some of my arguments are mentioned below. Additionally, they inserted religion into their legal thinking. Though they admit religion was not brought up during the case, they decided to mention it anyway. Near the end of their decision they write,

We [now] consider the reason for the exclusion of gay and lesbian couples from civil marriage left unspoken by the County: religious opposition to same-sex marriage. (p. 63)

The Court’s decision need only to be based on the arguments and evidence presented. But they took the initiative and inserted religion. They believe, “While unexpressed, religious sentiment most likely motivates many, if not most, opponents of same-sex civil marriage.” Apparently, evidence alone is insufficient if a suspected religious motivation exists. The court believes more should be said, writing, “State government can have no religious views, either directly or indirectly, expressed through its legislation” (p. 66).

So I'll begin.

Lou Dobbs
I was watching Lou Dobbs on CNN the other night. A debate about gay marriage was going on and the person on the opposing side made the point that gay marriage would further divide marriage from the idea that children should be raised by their biological parents. The pro side made the point that gay marriage is discriminatory and should be ended on that basis; gay marriage was the moral thing to do.

My own thoughts
When the Iowa Supreme Court decided unanimously, unilaterally to disregard the will of the people of Iowa, overturn the Defense of Marriage Act, and institute their own definition of marriage to replace the one enacted by the state legislature, it was done from the view of equal protection before the law. (See Iowa Supreme Court Decision No. 07–1499, April 3, 2009). However, as every lawyer knows, the purpose of the law is to make discriminations, that is, to make distinctions between people and classes of people: criminals from non-criminals; felons from non-felons, minors from adults; legal citizens from illegal aliens, etc. The discrimination created by law speaks to the purpose of those laws. If one were to argue that because minors are often given special consideration when found guilty of a crime that adults should be given the same treatment one would be arguing those laws have no essential function. If it were argued that people have a right to claim social security benefits at any age they would be arguing there is no important rational behind retirement laws. If one were to argue that laws granting special privileges to married couples should be given to all persons, regardless of marital status, one would be arguing there is no special purpose to those laws. So if discrimination is the question how does one decide what is bad discrimination when the very purpose of the law is to create classes of people to which laws and privileges do and do not apply? The Iowa Supreme Court has addressed this question.

Equal protection demands that laws treat alike all people who are similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purposes of the law. (p. 25)

Therefore, “to truly ensure equality before the law, the equal protection guarantee requires that laws treat all those who are similarly situated with respect to the purposes of the law alike” (p. 27; italics original). Thus, to use my own examples, the blind cannot be barred from marrying because they are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law; people from different socioeconomic backgrounds cannot be barred from marrying because they are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law; a man and woman of different races cannot be barred from marrying for the same reason, they are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.

But what does similarly situated mean? The Court points out that no two people, or groups of people, are identical. Therefore, similarly situated cannot be taken to mean identical—some latitude must be permissible. But in order to address the meaning of “similarly situated” one must first determine the purpose of the law.

So what are the purposes of marriage laws? The Iowa Court has listed several which they believe outline the purpose of marriage.

1) Iowa’s marriage laws “are rooted in the necessity of providing an institutional basis for defining the fundamental relational rights and responsibilities of persons in organized society.”
2) Civil marriage is “a partnership to which both partners bring their financial resources as well as their individual energies and efforts.”
3) “These laws also serve to recognize the status of the parties’ committed relationship.”
4) “The marriage state is not one entered into for the purpose of labor and support alone, but also includes the comfort and happiness of the parties to the marriage contract.”
5) “[Marriage] is not a mere contract, but is a status.”
6) “Marriage changes the parties’ legal and social status.”
(p. 27-28)

Earlier in their decision the Court mentioned several difficulties mentioned by the plaintiffs, difficulties that accompany not being permitted to marry. They are

1) Life and death decisions affecting their partner.
2) Health care, burial arrangements, autopsy, disposition of remains following death.
3) Denial for partner’s state-provided health insurance and pension benefits; as well as private-employer-provided benefits and protections.
4) Spousal health club memberships.
(p. 9)

Following this the Court writes,

Yet, perhaps the ultimate disadvantage expressed in the testimony of the plaintiffs is the inability to obtain for themselves and for their children the personal and public affirmation that accompanies marriage. (p. 9)

The Court concludes, “Therefore, with respect to the subject and purposes of Iowa’s marriage laws, we find that the plaintiffs are similarly situated compared to heterosexual persons” (p. 28).

What have they done?
The Court has confused things important to marriage and which accompany it with the very purpose of the institution. They have reduced marriage to a collection of relational rights, financial resources, relationship validation, health club benefits, and social status. These things do accompany marriage; most are important for a successful marriage. But things that are essential to marriage are not the same thing as its purpose. By analogy, automobiles are useless without tires, engine, and gasoline but do not exist for the sake of having those things. Arguing they exist for the sake of tires, engine, and gasoline is an empty analysis: automobiles exist for the sake of their parts. Most of the items in the two above lists are given to married couples to help them have a successful marriage, not to define the purpose of the institution. But the Iowa Supreme Court has decided that things intended to help marriages succeed are the fundamental purpose of the institution. Marriage now becomes a morally vacuous institution. The purpose of the marriage becomes the things that accompany it.

Moreover, if the reasons listed above are the purposes of marriage then what rational basis is there for denying groups of people from marrying: say, four men and six women. If marriage exists for the purpose of defining relational rights, combining financial resources and individual energies, recognizing the parties’ committed relationship, comfort and happiness, status, and personal and public affirmation then it appears groups of people wanting “group marriage” are also similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.

This only illustrates that the reasons the Court gave for establishing the purpose of marriage are fundamentally perverse.

Question: What is the purpose of the marriage institution? Answer: To acquire the personal and public affirmation that accompanies marriage. Question: Why should same-sex couples be granted that affirmation? Answer: So they are not discriminated against; the law should apply equally to all.

The problem with the above line of reasoning is that if the purpose of the institution is to change one’s status to grant personal and public affirmation then the objective purpose of the law becomes obscured. After all, most people desire public affirmation and monetary advantages. Discrimination is reduced to not having privileges and no longer speaks to the objective purpose of marriage.

Conclusions
As the Iowa Supreme Court mentioned, “classification is the essence of all legislation” (p. 32).

So arguing that same-sex couples should be permitted to marry because denying them such a right is discriminatory is a phony argument. The purpose of law is to make such-like discriminations. I sometimes feel that people who use the “marriage equality” mantra are making a rather very weak argument: people like marriage; people like equality; so who would say no to “marriage equality”?

But if taken to task on this argument they must state how same-sex couples are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law. And if they argue as the Iowa Supreme Court did—that gays are similarly situated because of their desire for relational rights, financial resources, relationship validation, health club benefits, and social status—their argument isn’t a strong one. Marriage is reduced to the material considerations that accompany it.

Is the purpose of marriage to grand benefits? Or are the purposes of benefits to assist marriage? What then is the purpose of marriage? Those questions tend to be avoided.

Reducing marriage to material benefits accords a weak argument. Arguing marriage is a fundamental right is subjective, as a fundamental can’t be reduced further. Arguing that same-sex civil marriage should be permitted because of the public affirmation it brings to the couple is a rather touchy-feely argument which doesn’t address the fundamental question, “Why does marriage exist?”

Their position is not as strong as it often appears.